Add to ORKGThe paper is a comment on "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout" by Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta(2012). They analyse a model of multilateral bargaining under the assumption of common discount factor. We show a strong drawback of employing such an assumption
Article“The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0461...
We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers ...
We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize hig...
The paper is a comment on "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout" by Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta...
This article characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or...
This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or ...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to assemble objects owned by m...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis i...
This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing o...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) show a unique and efficient outcome in a model of multilateral bargaining...
In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the...
This paper studies bargaining with noncommon priors where the buyer projects and exaggerates the pro...
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that barg...
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear p...
Article“The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0461...
We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers ...
We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize hig...
The paper is a comment on "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout" by Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta...
This article characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or...
This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or ...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to assemble objects owned by m...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis i...
This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing o...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) show a unique and efficient outcome in a model of multilateral bargaining...
In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the...
This paper studies bargaining with noncommon priors where the buyer projects and exaggerates the pro...
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that barg...
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear p...
Article“The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0461...
We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers ...
We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize hig...